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Winter Warning Advisory

V8 Beast

By V8 Beast
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V8 Beast Newbie

V8 Beast

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Posted

Yes it's cold... but do not:

 

Threaten people

Even a smiley face at the end could result in a vacation so be careful.

 

NWS

A lot of you look at the forums from work. Think about that before posting a pic. Link the nudes people.

 

Shit in for sale threads

Way too much of this going on. Use PM's if you want to tell the op something about the thread you don't like.

 

Newbs

Stop welcoming nooooobs already! Your rep points have no value so stop wasting your time.

 

I honestly shouldn't have to post this, but it seems like you children need a reminder :p

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Kevin R. Newbie

Kevin R.

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thats a threat! I call mod abuse of powers!

 

 

 

seriously, I'll do anything to not write this goddamn paper. Anyone wanna do a paper on the Root-Takahira agreement for me?

 

HERE U GO MAN

 

 

On November 30, 1908 American Secretary of State Eliuh Root and the Japanese Ambassador in Washington Takahira Kogoro initialed an agree-ment which has now come to be known as the Root-Takahira Agreement.In this agreement, both governments agreed to: 1) maintain the status quo in the Pacific; 2) assure equal opportunity to develop trade and industry inChina; 3) recognize the territories possessed by each country in the Pa-cific region; 4) respect China’s territorial integrity and independence. 1 Inother words, this agreement contained two overarching themes, namely,the open door policy and respect for each other’s territorial possessions.Although the Root-Takahira Agreement was concluded during a periodwhich has come to be known as that of the era of the revolution in diplo-macy, very little attention has to date been paid to it. This agreement came to light during a period in which two camps were competing to have the U.S. join their proposed tripartite alliances (with one consisting of China and Germany and the other of Japan and England). In other words, the U.S. possessed the casting vote needed to maintain the balance of power between these two military governments. It is a well-known fact that theimperial powers were divided into two military camps during this period * Lecturer , Dept. of History, Hanyang University

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134 The Russo-Japanese War and the Root-Takahira Agreement and that the isolation of Germany was one of the main causes of the out-break of WWI. In other words, prior to the outbreak of WWI, the U.S. didnot pursue a policy based on isolation from the international community.Moreover, the fact that Japan was able to speed up the process of formallyannexing Korea following the signing of this agreement should also bekept in mind. While prior to this agreement Japan had hesitated between keeping Korea as a protectorate and annexing it outright, its decision to annex the country was made shortly after this agreement was reached. This can be perceived as having been no coincidence. More to the point,the Root-Takahira Agreement of 1908 can be regarded as having been a landmark event even when viewed solely from the standpoint of its influ-ence on the international situation at that time. This being the case, let us now look at the reasons why the U.S. chose to sign this agreement. A closer look at the contents of this agreement reveals two overarching U.S. motivations. While the first can be identi-fied as the desire to assure the continuation of the open door policy inChina, the second revolved around the protection of its territorial posses-sions in the Pacific. Moreover, these twin objectives represented a con-stant in the U.S.’ East Asian policy. Nevertheless, most studies on thisagreement have tended to focus almost exclusively on its relation to the open door policy in China. The majority of scholars, including A. Whit-ney Griswold, have claimed that this agreement involved the U.S. silently acquiescing to Japan’s preponderant position in East Asia in return for securing concessions from Japan on the immigration issue. 2 Meanwhile,Thomas A. Baily has argued that because of this agreement, the U.S. posi-tion in Manchuria was greatly enhanced. Thus, this agreement did notgive Japan a free hand in Manchuria, but rather resulted in strengthening the open door policy in Manchuria, which in turn removed the largest source of complaint for American entrepreneurs. 3 Others have claimed that this agreement allowed the U.S. to avoid being completely excludedin Manchuria. 4 However, it is hard to envisage that the main purpose for the U.S. with regards to this agreement was to secure the continuation of the open door

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Choi Jeong-soo 135 policy. This is because this objective runs contrary to some of the other provisions contained in this agreement; for example, the recognition of itsterritorial possessions in the Pacific and the maintenance of the status quo.First, this agreement contained a clause which called for the mutual rec-ognition of the territories in the Pacific region possessed by each country.The recognition of its overseas territories had been an overarching con-cern for the U.S. since 1898 when its expansion into Asia began in earnest following its victory over Spain. These concerns became even more wide-spread following the performance of the Japanese military in the Russo-Japanese War. From that point on, American strategists became preoccu-pied with one issue: should a crisis break out, could the U.S. protect itsoverseas territories in the Pacific, including the Philippines, from the Japanese? Second, the U.S. position during this period did not allow it to simulta-neously pursue the continuation of the open door policy and the securing of its overseas territories in the Pacific. Originally, the U.S. had attemptedto play Russia off against Japan in order to facilitate its own ability tocatch two birds with one stone. However, this strategy was no longer fea-sible in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War, as Russian militarypower was greatly curtailed as a result of its defeat at the hands of Japan.Furthermore, as part of its pursuit of a tripartite entente structure withJapan and France, Russia made it clear after 1907 that it had no intentionof attempting to restrain Japan in the military and diplomatic spheres. What’s more, the signing of a military alliance between Japan’s ally Eng-land and Russia and France in effect resulted in creating a four-nation security arrangement consisting of England, France, Russia, and Japan. In other words, the only country capable of restraining Japan in the Pacific was the U.S. As such, as the strategy of playing Russia off against Japanwas no longer feasible, the only means of preserving the open door policy in China was to defeat Japan in a military conflict. However, the U.S.government deemed at the time of the Russo-Japanese War that should the U.S. and Japan come to blows, there was no way for Washington to pro-tect its overseas possessions in the Pacific.

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136 The Russo-Japanese War and the Root-Takahira Agreement Third, the clause pertaining to the open door policy also does not mesh with the provision regarding the maintenance of the status quo. From the U.S. standpoint, the continuation of the status quo was necessary in order to assure the security of its overseas territories in the Pacific. However,from the Japanese standpoint, the status quo meant that its preponderantposition in Manchuria, which it had acquired in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War, was recognized by the U.S. Therefore, when viewedfrom the standpoint of logic, these two provisions are inherently contra-dictory. In other words, if the U.S. had intended to include Manchuria asfalling within the sphere of its open door policy in China, Japan would never had agreed to sign this agreement.As pointed out above, given the international situation at that time, could the U.S. really have simultaneously dealt with the issues of the open door policy and the securing of its overseas territories? Thus, this is why these two provisions found in the agreement were of a contradictory nature. Thus, could it not be asserted that the main objective of the U.S. inpursuing such an agreement was in fact the acquirement of a Japaneseguarantee of the security of its overseas territories in the Pacific ratherthan the continuation of the open door policy in China? This paper is intended to prove that the real reason why the U.S. signedthe Root-Takahira Agreement was in fact what has been postulated above: to secure a promise from the Japanese to keep their hands off the U.S.’overseas possessions in the Pacific. In order to achieve this objective, thispaper is focused on analyzing the international situation which prevailedat the time of the agreement, rather than the actual contents of this agree-ment as has been the case in previous studies. This is because the circum-stances surrounding this agreement allow us to read between the lines and to properly comprehend what the contents of this agreement really per-tained to. Special attention has been paid to the U.S. perception of the Russo-Japanese War, its decision to build its main Pacific naval base in Hawaii (1908), and its attitude towards the 2 nd Hague Peace Conference (1907). These events provide us with a window through which to perceive the main American concerns during the period leading up to the signing

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Choi Jeong-soo 137 of the Root-Takahira Agreement.The first part of this paper will deal with the U.S. decision to alter its plans to build its main Pacific naval base in the Philippines in favor ofconstructing it in Hawaii. An attempt will be made herein to prove thatthis decision was an important factor which led to the conclusion of aU.S.-Japan agreement. Moreover, this paper will prove that the potent Japanese naval power put on display during the Russo-Japanese Warforced the U.S. to move its main naval base in the Pacific to Hawaii, and that the U.S. had no choice but to rely on diplomacy in order to protect its territories in the Pacific until this naval base, which would provide the U.S. with the retaliatory force it would need in case of a Japanese attack, was completed. The result of this reliance on diplomacy was the Root-Takahira Agreement. In the second half of this paper, it will be proventhat the failure of the 2 nd Hague Peace Conference was another factor which prompted the U.S. to sign this agreement. As the U.S. proposal for the placing of limits on naval power was rejected during this conference, the U.S. found itself with no other option but to concentrate its naval forces in the Atlantic. Thus, the issue of how to fill the power vacuumcreated in the Pacific by the absence of U.S. naval power emerged as a crucial matter for U.S. policymakers. In the end, the U.S. had no otherchoice but to play for time and use diplomacy vis-à-vis Japan until an independent naval fleet could be amassed in the Pacific. The result wasthe Root-Takahira Agreement. The Russo-Japanese War and the Decision to Establish a Naval Base in Hawaii The seeds of the Root-Takahira Agreement were first sown during the Russo-Japanese War. By February 1905, the U.S. had already reached the conclusion that war with Japan over the Japanese labor immigration prob-lem was a definite possibility. Moreover, given the potent Japanese naval power made evident during the Russo-Japanese War, the U.S. would be

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138 The Russo-Japanese War and the Root-Takahira Agreement unable to assure the security of the Philippines and Hawaii. 5 This kind of concern became a permanent one for Roosevelt in the af-termath of the Battle of Tsushima. The security of the Philippines waswidely regarded as the most pressing concern. A report submitted by General Wood, the American Commander in the Philippines, clearly makes this fact evident. In this report Wood claimed that as Japanese na-val power was greatly superior to the U.S. it could seize the Philippinesanytime it wanted to. 6 Roosevelt agreed with the contents of this report. Roosevelt’s own perception was based on the fact that it was impossiblefor the U.S. to assure the three conditions needed to ensure the security ofthe Philippines. These three conditions were the following: First, the U.S. should have amore potent navy at its disposal than Japan; second, Japanshould be made to focus solely on Korea and southern Manchuria; third, the international conditions needed to restrain Japan should be in place. 7 However, the U.S. was only able at that time to meet the second conditionas the increase of U.S. naval power was opposed by the U.S. Congress.Moreover, the establishment of an anti-Japan alliance became impossible in the aftermath of the 2 nd Anglo-Japanese military alliance. In the end, who would go along with the U.S. and oppose Japan, which by then pos-sessed the world’s strongest navy. Roosevelt undertook a review of the U.S. ability to single-handedly re-pel a Japanese attack. The Orange War Plan established from February-June 1907 dealt with such a war between the U.S. and Japan. This planwas premised on the U.S. dispatching its fleet from the Atlantic to the Pacific in order to safeguard the Philippines in the case of a conflagration with Japan. However, even if such a step could in fact be carried out,there was no way of assuring the protection of the Philippines. Thisprompted Roosevelt to comment that the Philippines were the ‘U.S. Achilles Heel.” 8 Roosevelt’s comment, which emerged on August 21, 1907, or one month after the finalization of the Orange War Plan, makes itclear that the U.S. remained convinced that the Philippines could not beprotected from Japanese aggression. The possibility of relocating the At-lantic fleet to the Pacific in order to protect the Philippines was also re-

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