Good Read About Vietnam

[Guest Hal]

I seem to be in the spirit of writing reviews lately. This one was for a military policy class, but it was a good read. Anyone interested in Vietnam or the policy decisions which led us to Vietnam, this is a good book for you.

 

H. R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam (New York, HarperCollins, 1998)

 

The war in Vietnam remains a source of heated debate amongst historians and observers alike. No modern American war has been as divisive and as brutal as Vietnam. The continuing turbulence around the Vietnam War leads many to question why the United States entered into a ground war in Vietnam. In Dereliction of Duty, H. R. McMaster sets out to provide the reasons we went to war. McMaster uses both primary and secondary sources to craft a superb narrative detailing the political maneuvering, misinformation, and lies used by the Johnson Administration to push the United States to war.

 

As a Major in the U.S. Army, McMaster is in a position to influence the course of American history. Armed with the knowledge of his position, McMaster provides an even focus of both the policy and military actions that landed the United States in an unpopular foreign war. McMaster himself does not present any extensive analysis of the information provided, rather he simply tells the story of the near constant failures of our senior leadership as they purposefully drove the United States to war.

 

McMaster begins with the introduction of Robert McNamara as Secretary of Defense during the Kennedy Administration. McNamara’s appointment represented a fundamental shift in presidential use of military advisors, ushering in an era of civilian advisors on military matters. McNamara was a pivotal component of the Johnson leadership team which became valued calculations and numbers above military experience. From the appointment of McNamara, McMaster moves quickly into the substance of his narrative: the combined leadership actions – spearheaded by President Johnson - that mired the United States in an unwinnable war.

 

Kennedy's assassination in 1963 thrust an unprepared, former U.S. Senator, Lyndon Johnson, into the presidency. Almost immediately, Johnson's insecurities and extreme desire to be well-liked became evident. Decisions arising from these qualities ultimately led Johnson down the path to war. McMaster devotes a significant amount of time to Johnson's policy decisions as they molded his public image in the presidential election of 1964. During this time, Johnson, McNamara, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff begin to lay the true foundation for the U.S. entering into an unwinnable war. Johnson's obsession with winning the presidential election forced him and his closest advisors to hide the full extent of American involvement in Vietnam. Their methods of hiding the truth ranged from simple misinformation to blatant fabrications, often invented by Robert McNamara, being fed to Congress and the American public. This well-crafted, ever evolving, web of lies ultimately becomes so cumbersome that it forces the Johnson Administration to continue on a course that rapidly became irreversible. McMaster points out that this damning web of lies was exacerbated by the ineptitude of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which served to support every position Johnson and McNamara presented.

 

McMaster's description and criticism of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is masterfully crafted and well-deserved. As McNamara and Johnson continued to create their own truths, the Joint Chiefs of Staff indulged in infighting and incompetence, retreating from their responsibilities to be the president's primary military advisors. McMaster asserts that the actions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff can be attributed to service parochialism. Their unwillingness to function in a true joint capacity allowed the President and McNamara to pursue their objective without any real checks by the senior military leaders. At nearly every step toward war by the Johnson administration, there is an equal misstep taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Their misconduct may be judged more easily as unwillingness to work together; however, this is little better than the more intentional misconduct of Johnson and McNamara.

 

McMaster's attempt to answer the question of “why” provides remarkable insight into the accumulated failures that led to ground war in Vietnam. Many writers focus on theories that the United States’ entrance into war was accidental or a result of Cold War politics. McMaster settles the debate with a simpler, if more distasteful, answer. President Johnson, Robert McNamara, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff drove the United States to war. It was their policies and behaviors rather than Cold War politics or vagaries of fate which started an unwinnable war. Dereliction of Duty is a compelling narrative which should be studied by anyone interested in the decisions which lead to the Vietnam War.

[El Karacho1647545492]

This is an excellent book.

 

For those interested in the complete opposite perspective of Vietnam, If I Die in a Combat Zone, Box Me Up and Ship Me Home by Tim O'Brien is great.