Kevin R.

That is bullshit. My thread was about to be way better. http://www.bamagz.com/forums/showthread.php?p=3381

I forgot to stop in NTB last weekend. http://smiley.onegreatguy.net/banghead.gif

http://smiley.onegreatguy.net/bowdown.gif

Well it didn't keep you out.....

Guy with a 350Z just came on with a ELECTRIC SUPERCHARGER! I lol'd for 10 minutes. LOLOLOLOLOLOLOLOLOLOL

Cannot go wrong with that! Nice buy. Those stripes painted on or vinyl?

I will personally go to one (1) thank-you dinner with you if you find me this costume for next years Halloween.

In the 1920's the German army was more than a bit hacked off at having lost WW1, and not exactly chuffed at the restrictions imposed by the Treaty of Versailles. Looking around it saw opportunities such as the Treaty of Rapallo to circumvent the restrictions that were capping the size, ability and components of the German armed forces. I agree with those that say the 1922 Treaty of Rapallo was largely the outcome of the new Soviet Russia being locked out of the international community and finding a bed-fellow in the defeated Germany, then the pariah in the diplomatic community. It would be fair to say that one of the main reasons for the two parties to sign a treaty was simply to cock a snook at the establishment of the day, which was refusing, more in pique than rational argument, to include the Soviets in the diplomatic circuit or to include the Germans in any meaningful way. An international conference on economic questions and reparations could hardly have been considered as practical and prudent if two of the major players of the day were excluded. Little wonder that they went off to play together elsewhere. Certainly military history shows that co-operation took place between the parties, clandestinely and probably of limited value to both parties. It was simply the best on offer to them at the time. I do not think that either side could ever muster enough trust in the other to overcome their individual paranoia to the extent of full co-operation. Okay, so the common "enemy" at the time was Poland, but they were both very aware that they had been at each others throats before, very recently in fact, and could well be again at short notice. Basically the Soviets were, as was in my view their pattern for the whole of their existence, short of the resources and initiatives to create the technologies necessary to efficiently slaughter those one felt due such attentions. "Comrade USpatentoffice" and industrialists such as Ford were not the only sources of the "glories of Soviet Power". The first tangible Soviet-German co-operation was, as far as I know, an agreement on 15 March 1922, which foreshadowed the open political statement of the Treaty of Rapallo. This agreement, to build an aeroplane factory in the Soviet Union, was between Junkers and the Soviet government. Junkers put up the expertise and the Soviet put up the money. In 1922 German troops were sent to train in the Soviet Union, the quid pro quo being the Soviets got the advantage of observing and participating in German military training methods. The parties also co-operated in the manufacture of poison gas and munitions in the Soviet Union, for the Germans to train with and equip their army. I believe that a lot more promises than actual gas or munitions would have been forthcoming if the Soviets followed their usual practices in such circumstances. About 1929 a tank training ground was operational in the Soviet Union in Kazan for German personnel and limited co-operation was established between the army staffs for participating in Soviet war games. With the growth of air power the ability for Germans to train as pilots at Lipetsk in the Soviet Union was also welcomed, a forerunner of the training grounds that the Spanish civil war would provide the same parties, albeit in a somewhat more realistic setting. Apparently factories were also established at Samara which may have produced aircraft, submarines, guns and various munitions. Germans such as General Hans von Seeckt dreamed of an alliance with the Soviets that would at least last long enough to finish off the state of Poland, as a precursor to the rise of a new Germany. Nice simplistic military thinking, devoid of any practical realism; it did however, in my view, all help Hitler to rise to power on the dreams of those who thought they could supplant him in power when he had done the spade work. I think that, given a bit less paranoia in the "West" at the time, the Treaty of Rapallo should have been seen for what it was, simply an arrangement between two outcasts to bolster their own self images and confidence, at a time when their great dreams, illusions and theories were failing around them with no sign of redemption. However, given the blinkered outlook of the Churchill types of the world it caused much more panic than it was worth. Most treaties would be far more useful if printed on soft absorbent paper, Rapallo is no different. Given the advantages each perceived it is likely that the levels of co-operation that did occur would not have been lost for want of the piece of paper. In the event the Treaty of Rapallo was initially conclude for an indefinite period, expanded on November 5, 1922 in Berlin, supplemented by the Treaty and exchange of notes April 24, 1926, prolonged on June 24, 1931 and May 5, 1933, only to be consigned to history by the events of June 22, 1941. The treaty is, in my view, an interesting display of the way in which political pragmatism overcomes the ostensible political differences that seem to important and irreconcilable to so many in the common herd. In the true spirit of capitalism I think most of what happened was simply guided by the desire of various parties in both countries to build their personal power and fortunes.

Maybe, just maybe, there is no secret recipe.

If these are in good shape I want them. (as in not rubbing off....guessing they are though) http://image.bizrate.com/resize?sq=160&uid=707452050&mid=52916

Fuck that. Just use what I typed up for you.

.rar files? Fuck that.

http://74.125.45.104/search?q=cache:jyH8CAtELqsJ:bk21khistory.korea.ac.kr/bbs/table/koreanhistory/upload/2914_006.pdf+root-takahira+agreement+paper&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=3&gl=us

HERE U GO MAN On November 30, 1908 American Secretary of State Eliuh Root and the Japanese Ambassador in Washington Takahira Kogoro initialed an agree-ment which has now come to be known as the Root-Takahira Agreement.In this agreement, both governments agreed to: 1) maintain the status quo in the Pacific; 2) assure equal opportunity to develop trade and industry inChina; 3) recognize the territories possessed by each country in the Pa-cific region; 4) respect China’s territorial integrity and independence. 1 Inother words, this agreement contained two overarching themes, namely,the open door policy and respect for each other’s territorial possessions.Although the Root-Takahira Agreement was concluded during a periodwhich has come to be known as that of the era of the revolution in diplo-macy, very little attention has to date been paid to it. This agreement came to light during a period in which two camps were competing to have the U.S. join their proposed tripartite alliances (with one consisting of China and Germany and the other of Japan and England). In other words, the U.S. possessed the casting vote needed to maintain the balance of power between these two military governments. It is a well-known fact that theimperial powers were divided into two military camps during this period * Lecturer , Dept. of History, Hanyang University Page 2 134 The Russo-Japanese War and the Root-Takahira Agreement and that the isolation of Germany was one of the main causes of the out-break of WWI. In other words, prior to the outbreak of WWI, the U.S. didnot pursue a policy based on isolation from the international community.Moreover, the fact that Japan was able to speed up the process of formallyannexing Korea following the signing of this agreement should also bekept in mind. While prior to this agreement Japan had hesitated between keeping Korea as a protectorate and annexing it outright, its decision to annex the country was made shortly after this agreement was reached. This can be perceived as having been no coincidence. More to the point,the Root-Takahira Agreement of 1908 can be regarded as having been a landmark event even when viewed solely from the standpoint of its influ-ence on the international situation at that time. This being the case, let us now look at the reasons why the U.S. chose to sign this agreement. A closer look at the contents of this agreement reveals two overarching U.S. motivations. While the first can be identi-fied as the desire to assure the continuation of the open door policy inChina, the second revolved around the protection of its territorial posses-sions in the Pacific. Moreover, these twin objectives represented a con-stant in the U.S.’ East Asian policy. Nevertheless, most studies on thisagreement have tended to focus almost exclusively on its relation to the open door policy in China. The majority of scholars, including A. Whit-ney Griswold, have claimed that this agreement involved the U.S. silently acquiescing to Japan’s preponderant position in East Asia in return for securing concessions from Japan on the immigration issue. 2 Meanwhile,Thomas A. Baily has argued that because of this agreement, the U.S. posi-tion in Manchuria was greatly enhanced. Thus, this agreement did notgive Japan a free hand in Manchuria, but rather resulted in strengthening the open door policy in Manchuria, which in turn removed the largest source of complaint for American entrepreneurs. 3 Others have claimed that this agreement allowed the U.S. to avoid being completely excludedin Manchuria. 4 However, it is hard to envisage that the main purpose for the U.S. with regards to this agreement was to secure the continuation of the open door Page 3 Choi Jeong-soo 135 policy. This is because this objective runs contrary to some of the other provisions contained in this agreement; for example, the recognition of itsterritorial possessions in the Pacific and the maintenance of the status quo.First, this agreement contained a clause which called for the mutual rec-ognition of the territories in the Pacific region possessed by each country.The recognition of its overseas territories had been an overarching con-cern for the U.S. since 1898 when its expansion into Asia began in earnest following its victory over Spain. These concerns became even more wide-spread following the performance of the Japanese military in the Russo-Japanese War. From that point on, American strategists became preoccu-pied with one issue: should a crisis break out, could the U.S. protect itsoverseas territories in the Pacific, including the Philippines, from the Japanese? Second, the U.S. position during this period did not allow it to simulta-neously pursue the continuation of the open door policy and the securing of its overseas territories in the Pacific. Originally, the U.S. had attemptedto play Russia off against Japan in order to facilitate its own ability tocatch two birds with one stone. However, this strategy was no longer fea-sible in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War, as Russian militarypower was greatly curtailed as a result of its defeat at the hands of Japan.Furthermore, as part of its pursuit of a tripartite entente structure withJapan and France, Russia made it clear after 1907 that it had no intentionof attempting to restrain Japan in the military and diplomatic spheres. What’s more, the signing of a military alliance between Japan’s ally Eng-land and Russia and France in effect resulted in creating a four-nation security arrangement consisting of England, France, Russia, and Japan. In other words, the only country capable of restraining Japan in the Pacific was the U.S. As such, as the strategy of playing Russia off against Japanwas no longer feasible, the only means of preserving the open door policy in China was to defeat Japan in a military conflict. However, the U.S.government deemed at the time of the Russo-Japanese War that should the U.S. and Japan come to blows, there was no way for Washington to pro-tect its overseas possessions in the Pacific. Page 4 136 The Russo-Japanese War and the Root-Takahira Agreement Third, the clause pertaining to the open door policy also does not mesh with the provision regarding the maintenance of the status quo. From the U.S. standpoint, the continuation of the status quo was necessary in order to assure the security of its overseas territories in the Pacific. However,from the Japanese standpoint, the status quo meant that its preponderantposition in Manchuria, which it had acquired in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War, was recognized by the U.S. Therefore, when viewedfrom the standpoint of logic, these two provisions are inherently contra-dictory. In other words, if the U.S. had intended to include Manchuria asfalling within the sphere of its open door policy in China, Japan would never had agreed to sign this agreement.As pointed out above, given the international situation at that time, could the U.S. really have simultaneously dealt with the issues of the open door policy and the securing of its overseas territories? Thus, this is why these two provisions found in the agreement were of a contradictory nature. Thus, could it not be asserted that the main objective of the U.S. inpursuing such an agreement was in fact the acquirement of a Japaneseguarantee of the security of its overseas territories in the Pacific ratherthan the continuation of the open door policy in China? This paper is intended to prove that the real reason why the U.S. signedthe Root-Takahira Agreement was in fact what has been postulated above: to secure a promise from the Japanese to keep their hands off the U.S.’overseas possessions in the Pacific. In order to achieve this objective, thispaper is focused on analyzing the international situation which prevailedat the time of the agreement, rather than the actual contents of this agree-ment as has been the case in previous studies. This is because the circum-stances surrounding this agreement allow us to read between the lines and to properly comprehend what the contents of this agreement really per-tained to. Special attention has been paid to the U.S. perception of the Russo-Japanese War, its decision to build its main Pacific naval base in Hawaii (1908), and its attitude towards the 2 nd Hague Peace Conference (1907). These events provide us with a window through which to perceive the main American concerns during the period leading up to the signing Page 5 Choi Jeong-soo 137 of the Root-Takahira Agreement.The first part of this paper will deal with the U.S. decision to alter its plans to build its main Pacific naval base in the Philippines in favor ofconstructing it in Hawaii. An attempt will be made herein to prove thatthis decision was an important factor which led to the conclusion of aU.S.-Japan agreement. Moreover, this paper will prove that the potent Japanese naval power put on display during the Russo-Japanese Warforced the U.S. to move its main naval base in the Pacific to Hawaii, and that the U.S. had no choice but to rely on diplomacy in order to protect its territories in the Pacific until this naval base, which would provide the U.S. with the retaliatory force it would need in case of a Japanese attack, was completed. The result of this reliance on diplomacy was the Root-Takahira Agreement. In the second half of this paper, it will be proventhat the failure of the 2 nd Hague Peace Conference was another factor which prompted the U.S. to sign this agreement. As the U.S. proposal for the placing of limits on naval power was rejected during this conference, the U.S. found itself with no other option but to concentrate its naval forces in the Atlantic. Thus, the issue of how to fill the power vacuumcreated in the Pacific by the absence of U.S. naval power emerged as a crucial matter for U.S. policymakers. In the end, the U.S. had no otherchoice but to play for time and use diplomacy vis-à-vis Japan until an independent naval fleet could be amassed in the Pacific. The result wasthe Root-Takahira Agreement. The Russo-Japanese War and the Decision to Establish a Naval Base in Hawaii The seeds of the Root-Takahira Agreement were first sown during the Russo-Japanese War. By February 1905, the U.S. had already reached the conclusion that war with Japan over the Japanese labor immigration prob-lem was a definite possibility. Moreover, given the potent Japanese naval power made evident during the Russo-Japanese War, the U.S. would be Page 6 138 The Russo-Japanese War and the Root-Takahira Agreement unable to assure the security of the Philippines and Hawaii. 5 This kind of concern became a permanent one for Roosevelt in the af-termath of the Battle of Tsushima. The security of the Philippines waswidely regarded as the most pressing concern. A report submitted by General Wood, the American Commander in the Philippines, clearly makes this fact evident. In this report Wood claimed that as Japanese na-val power was greatly superior to the U.S. it could seize the Philippinesanytime it wanted to. 6 Roosevelt agreed with the contents of this report. Roosevelt’s own perception was based on the fact that it was impossiblefor the U.S. to assure the three conditions needed to ensure the security ofthe Philippines. These three conditions were the following: First, the U.S. should have amore potent navy at its disposal than Japan; second, Japanshould be made to focus solely on Korea and southern Manchuria; third, the international conditions needed to restrain Japan should be in place. 7 However, the U.S. was only able at that time to meet the second conditionas the increase of U.S. naval power was opposed by the U.S. Congress.Moreover, the establishment of an anti-Japan alliance became impossible in the aftermath of the 2 nd Anglo-Japanese military alliance. In the end, who would go along with the U.S. and oppose Japan, which by then pos-sessed the world’s strongest navy. Roosevelt undertook a review of the U.S. ability to single-handedly re-pel a Japanese attack. The Orange War Plan established from February-June 1907 dealt with such a war between the U.S. and Japan. This planwas premised on the U.S. dispatching its fleet from the Atlantic to the Pacific in order to safeguard the Philippines in the case of a conflagration with Japan. However, even if such a step could in fact be carried out,there was no way of assuring the protection of the Philippines. Thisprompted Roosevelt to comment that the Philippines were the ‘U.S. Achilles Heel.” 8 Roosevelt’s comment, which emerged on August 21, 1907, or one month after the finalization of the Orange War Plan, makes itclear that the U.S. remained convinced that the Philippines could not beprotected from Japanese aggression. The possibility of relocating the At-lantic fleet to the Pacific in order to protect the Philippines was also re- Page 7

I was just in class for 4 hours and did a lot of thinking. Can you whispergasm girls over the phone Robbie?

Fuckin Photobucket shrank the funny.

If the company is still around.

That was fucking badass.

http://i8.photobucket.com/albums/a6/qwik5o/ug.jpg

Don't tell people Rick sent you. Nice cars. We want pics. Welcome.

http://i8.photobucket.com/albums/a6/qwik5o/org.jpg

Hahaha. That happened to me when I worked at Tim Hortons as a kid, they simply paid me way too much on a check for reasons I don't know, but I returned the money.

I LOL everytime I read one of my posts. Sometimes I spend hours just looking at them all. I think I might compile a book one day.

You'd probably kill yourself.

You're welcome.